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1. Introduction 
 
Renewable energy development can cause several external impacts that need to be taken 
into account to achieve socially optimal decisions on placement of energy production sites. The 
values of such externalities are often not directly reflected in market prices. Nonmarket 
valuation methodology based on stated preferences (SPs) can be used to evaluate these effects 
and provide decision-makers with information necessary to run social cost–benefit analyses. 
When individuals make choices in SP studies they consider giving or receiving money in 
exchange for alterations in quality or quantity of a good in a hypothetical market. 
In nonmarket valuation a crucial question is whether estimated values are sensitive to the 
direction of price changes. An increase in price can be seen as a loss of money, while a decrease 
in price may be considered a gain in money. If estimated values are sensitive to the direction of 
price changes, then the standard neoclassical framework, which assumes constant marginal 
utility of income changes, would not be appropriate for organizing and interpreting the results 
from the SP studies. 
This issue has been investigated in the recent choice experiment (CE) study by Aravena et 
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al. (2014) on the introduction of wind power as an alternative renewable energy source in Chile. 
The authors examine whether respondents’ marginal willingness to pay (WTP) is influenced by 
the direction of changes in the price vector described in a CE design. They find evidence that 
values stated for changes in the CE attributes are unaffected by the direction of the price change. 
However, CE studies in other contexts, including sets of public programs, freight transport or 
water service, conflict with these findings, providing evidence of asymmetrical responses to 
price increases and decreases regarding the valued attributes (e.g., see Ozdemir, 2016; Masiero 
and Henscher, 2010; Lanz et al., 2010). This latter pattern of asymmetrical responses can be 
explained by prospect theory, which was originally proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 
1991). According to this theory, the prospect of monetary gain in selling has a different (less) 
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weight than the aversion to loss of the good. In the literature, loss aversion in the context of 
assigning values of nonmarket goods has been considered a putative cause of the discrepancy 
between WTP and willingness to accept (WTA). 
Bateman et al. (2005) pose the question as to whether individuals construe money outlays 
(price increases) as losses or foregone gains when they relinquish money in exchange for goods. 
Based on the results of their experiment, Bateman et al. conclude that the WTP/WTA disparity 
is caused both by loss aversion regarding the good and by a perception of loss regarding paying 
money. In contrast, the results of Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) suggest an absence of loss 
aversion for money, at least in routine  transactions. This latter  view  is supported by a 
neuropsychological study by Weber et al. (2007). They provide evidence that the brain regions 
responsible for fear perception are activated during selling but not during buying in a routine 
transaction, which seems to suggest loss aversion for goods as well as an absence of loss 
aversion for money. 
In routine transactions individuals are familiar with the traded good. In many nonmarket 
valuation studies, however, the evaluation concerns goods or services that people are not 
familiar with and consequently perceive as uncertain (see e.g. Czajkowski et al., 2014, or 
LaRiviere et al. 2014). List (2004), for example, finds that individuals behave according to 
neoclassical theory for everyday consumable goods, but the pattern of his results also suggests 
that prospect theory adequately describes patterns of behavior among inexperienced traders. 
A main objective of this study is to examine whether marginal WTP is influenced by 
the direction of changes in the price vector in a particular context; that is renewable energy 
development. We examine whether the asymmetry apparent in respondents’ choices to avoid 
renewable energy externalities can be explained by economic drivers, such as financial loss 
aversion and risk preferences. This line of inquiry is meaningful because the marginal utility of 
income is a crucial determinant of the WTP that SP surveys are aiming for. Subsequently, the 
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amount of externalities measured in these surveys might not only depend on the environmental 
changes of interest but also on factors affecting the marginal utility of income. In our survey, 
we combine the CE, which involves the development of renewable energies production sites 
(REPS) in close proximity to respondents’ place of residence, with a multiple price list lottery 
(MPL) choice task to elicit financial loss aversion and risk preferences. Both risk preferences 
and loss aversion enter the estimated mixed logit model (MXL) via interaction effects, with 
separate variables capturing either the cost increase or the cost decrease. 
In the CE we use both increases and decreases of the electricity bills to depict the 
uncertainty about the effect of new sources of energy generation on the current price level. 
Increases and decreases are presented simultaneously on the same choice tasks. Attributes and 
alternative labels presented in the CE describe the source and the location of energy sites 
andhigh-voltage transmission lines. Although the CE design does not present uncertainty over 
the utility gain (loss) from avoiding the renewable energy externalities directly, we assume that 
the respondent may be uncertain regarding the outcome. 
To capture financial risk loss aversion and risk preferences, we apply a MPL with a 
paired lottery design introduced by Tanaka et al. (2010). This design is among the most 
common and frequently used experimental risk preference elicitation methods (see Binswanger, 
1980 and Holt and Laury, 2002). Tanaka et al. (2010) extended the standard MPL to allow for 
the calculation of risk preferences parameters as well as a loss aversion parameter. This design 
has been applied inter alia by Nguyen and Leung (2009) and Liu (2013), who showed that 
people with low education are also able to understand the extended MPL. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section introduces both the CE and 
the MPL method, and Section 3 describes the empirical survey. Section 4 contains the results 
of the analysis, and Section 5 discusses these results, draws some conclusions, and identifies 
further avenues of research. 
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2. Methodology 
 
2.1. Choice experiment and econometric approach 
 
To elicit values of avoiding renewable energy externalities we apply CE methodology. 
The CE is based on the consumer theory of Lancaster (1966) and assumes that any good can be 
described in terms of its attributes. Application of CE allows deriving a marginal rate of 
substitution between those attributes. The marginal rate of substitution between a nonmonetary 
and a monetary attribute provides a marginal WTP for the nonmonetary attribute. 
The theoretical foundations for the analysis of our CE data are provided by McFadden’s 
(1974) random utility theory. Formally, assume that the utility U derived from respondent i ’s 
choice of alternative j in choice task t can be expressed by the following: 
 
 
 
 
U
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β
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(1) 
 
 
 
 
where the utility expression is separable in attribute levels X with the vector of associated 
parameters β , and a stochastic component e allowing for other factors than those observed by 
a modeler to affect individuals’ choices. 
To analyze data, we apply a MXL model. In the MXL model consumer i has specific, 
 
albeit nonobservable, parameters of the utility function that follow a priori specified 
multivariate distribution in a population βI ~ I (I, Σ), where I is the vector of the mean values 
of parameters and  Σ is their variance–covariance matrix. These models allow capturing the 
 
impact of choice invariant characteristics on utility. This is achieved by letting the distributions 
of  random  parameters  be  heterogeneous  with  observed  respondents’  characteristics  (wI). 
Formally, βI ~ I (b + ΔzI , Σ), where  Δ are estimable vectors of  parameters that enter 
 
heterogeneous means and variances of random parameters (Greene, 2011). By assuming a 
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structured variation of individual tastes in the sample, in the form of individual-based 
parameters, the MXL model is more realistic and typically yields a much better fit to the data 
(Greene and Hensher, 2007) than multinomial logit models in which all respondents are 
assumed to have exactly the same preference parameters. 
In the MXL model the stochastic component of the utility function is of unknown, 
 
 
possibly heteroskedastic variance var 
e 
□  s2  .  Identification  of  the  model  is  
typically 
ijt i 
assured by normalizing this variance, making the error term ijt   eijt  i , where, identically 
and 
independently, extreme value type 1 is distributed with a constant variance var
 
ijt    2   6 . 
This specification of the error term leads to convenient expression of choice probabilities: an 
individual will choose alternative j if Uijt  Uikt , for all k  j , and the probability that 
alternative j is chosen from a set of J alternatives becomes 
P  j|J   
 
 
 
exp  X ijt      iβi 
 
J 
exp  X β 
k 1 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
 
 
In the above specification, the preference parameters became iβi  as a result of 
normalization. Due to the ordinal nature of utility (the preference parameters do not have a 
direct interpretation anyway), this specification still represents the same preferences for 
individual i . 
No closed form expression of equation (2) exists when the coefficients are assumed to 
be random variables following the specified probability distributions. However, the expression 
can be simulated by averaging over D draws from the assumed distributions (Revelt and Train, 
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1998). As a result, the simulated log-likelihood function becomes 
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where y
ijt 
is a dummy variable equal to 1, if respondent i  selected alternative  j  in choice 
 
situation t , and 0 otherwise. Maximizing the simulated log-likelihood function in equation (3) 
allows deriving coefficient estimates, while the inverse of the negative of the Hessian at 
convergence becomes the approximation of the asymptotic variance–covariance matrix, 
allowing for deriving the standard errors associated with model estimates.1 
 
 
 
2.2. Risk preferences and loss aversion 
 
To investigate individuals’ loss aversion and risk preferences we use sets of two-outcome 
lotteries in the financial domain. We assume that the utility function for a two-outcome gamble 
takes the following form: 
 
 
 
l(y, I; Y, 1) = 1
1(I)';:(y) + 11 − 1(I)n';:(Y) II y > Y > 0 II y < Y < 0 
1(I)';:(y) + 1(1)';:(Y) II y < 0 < Y 
 
(4) 
 
 
 
 
where ';:(y) and ';:(Y) are value functions, 1(I) and 1(1) are probability weighting functions, 
 
x and y are the outcomes, and p and q are probabilities associated with those outcomes (and p 
 
+ q = 1). 
 
The value function considered in this application is: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 The  model was estimated using a DCE package developed in Matlab and available at 
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https://github.com/czaj/DCE. The code and data for estimating the model presented here, as well as additional 
results, are available from http://czaj.org/research/supplementary-materials. 
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 ';:(y) = 1 
y
 
 
II y ≥ 0 
−I(−y)  II y < 0 
(5)
 
 
 
 
 
where x is an outcome,  represents risk preferences (curvature of the value function), and  
is the degree of loss aversion. If an individual is risk loving then  >1; if risk neutral, then  
= 1; and if risk averse, then  0 <  <1. However,  can take only positive values. It measures 
one’s sensitivity to loss compared to gain. The higher the value of , the  more loss 
averse an individual is. 
In PT, gains and losses are compared to a reference point (the current position) and can 
 
accommodate different weightings – specifically, losses can be weighted more heavily than 
equivalent gains. Following Tanaka et al. 2010, we assume a nonlinear probability weighting 
measure (see Prelec, 1998). In this case, the probability weighting function is written as 
follows2: 
1(I) = lyI[− (−ll I)n] (6) 
 
 
 
 
where p is the probability of the outcome x, and  is the probability sensitivity parameter. If 
 
 
< 1, the weighting function takes an inverted S-shape; that is, individuals overweight small 
probabilities and underweight large probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Hence, these 
individuals are probabilistic risk averse for low-likelihood losses and high-likelihood gains and 
conversely probabilistic risk seeking for low-likelihood gains and high-likelihood losses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 This process of transforming the probabilities into decision weights breaks the independence axiom; that is, 
probabilities and outcomes are independent (Starmer, 2000). 
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3. Survey 
 
3.1. Survey, data collection and sample 
 
The survey consisted of five main sections. In the first section the respondents were 
informed that renewable energies as well as the electricity grid would be expanded in Poland. 
Additionally, this section provided respondents with general information concerning wind, 
solar, and biomass energy and collected information about respondents’ exposure to renewable 
energy production sites and their general attitude towards them. Pictures and graphical 
illustration supported the text. Section 2 presented the choice tasks. For each task, respondents 
were asked to choose their preferred option from among several alternatives regarding the 
development of renewable energy production sites within 10 km of their place of residence. 
The choice sets, which were presented in a randomized order, contained both increases and 
decreases in the monthly energy bill the household has to pay, according to the experimental 
design (see Section 3.2). In section 4, individuals’ financial risk preferences were elicited by 
using MPL, which was prefaced with the instructions adapted from Tanaka et al. (2010) that 
explained the task mechanism, and further attitudinal statements were presented to respondents. 
Socio-demographic variables were requested in the last section. 
The survey took place in January 2016. The sample is representative of the Polish 
population in terms of age, gender, the size of the community, and geographical location. In 
total, 800 face-to-face interviews were conducted using the computer-assisted personal 
interviewing (CAPI) system by a professional polling agency. The questionnaire and the lottery 
task were tested for understandability with students from the Faculty of Economic Sciences at 
the University of Warsaw and people from the general public. Additionally, the discrete choice 
part of the survey was tested earlier in a survey in Germany (EnergyEFFAR project; see 
Oehlmann und Meyerhoff, 2016). 
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3.2. Choice attributes and experimental design 
 
We adapted the CE designed for the project EnergyEFFAR.3 The CE comprises four labeled 
alternatives. The first three refer to the development of wind, solar, and biomass energy sites 
within 10 km of a respondent’s place of residence. The fourth alternative (future status quo, 
FSQ) indicates that respondents agree to not have an influence on the renewable energy 
extension in their neighborhood, and the attribute levels presented in this option were acceptable 
to them (see also Figure 1). The CE was introduced to the respondents in a following way: 
“Renewable energies as well as the electricity grid will be expanded in Poland. On the following 
choice sets, you can choose among different alternatives of renewable energy development. 
Please think of renewable energy production sites to be built in the 10 km surroundings of your 
place of residence. If you live in a large city, please consider the surrounding area of your city.” 
In order to facilitate understanding of alternatives’ descriptions we applied pictograms 
presented in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Renewable energy: definitions and pictograms 
 
Type Definition Pictogram 
 
 
Wind energy 
Electricity  generation  with  single wind turbines and  wind 
farms exclusively onshore 
 
 
 
 
Solar energy 
Electricity generation with photovoltaic system in the open 
landscape 
 
 
 
Biomass 
Electricity  generation  with  biogas  and  biomass  from  the 
cultivation of, for example, corn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 The CE design in both Polish and German studies is the same apart from the adaption of cost levels to the Polish 
conditions (we used the nominal exchange rate from 2015 with the PPP adjustment). We purposefully aimed to 
have similar designs in both countries to enable to conduct a benefit transfer investigation, which is the subject of 
another study. 
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In the CE we used four attributes related to renewable energy landscape externalities and a 
monetary attribute. The monetary attribute took the form of increase or decrease in respondents’ 
current energy bills. The choice of FSQ resulted in no increases in energy bills. Table 2 shows 
the full list of attributes and their levels used in the experimental design. 
 
 
Table 2 
 
CE attributes and levels 
 
Attribute Attribute label Attribute level 
 
Minimum distance to residential 
areas 
Distance 
 
Size of renewable energy 
 
300 m, 600 m, 900 m (FSQ), 1600 m, 
2500 m 
production sites 
REPS size Small, medium (FSQ), large* 
 
Number of renewable energy 
production sites 
REPS number 1, 2, 3 (FSQ), 4, 5 
 
Share of landscape not used for 
renewable energy expansion** 
Landscape 10%, 20%, 30% (FSQ), 40%, 50% 
 
High-voltage transmission lines HVTL Overhead (FSQ), underground 
 
 
Monthly change in energy bill 
(annually) 
Cost
 
−20 zł (−240 zł), −10 zł (−120 zł), 0zł 
(FSQ), +5 zł (+60 zł), +15 zł (+180zł), 
+30 zł (+360 zł), +50 zł (+600 zł)** 
 
* For the wind energy alternative, small was defined as 5–10 turbines, medium as 18–25 turbines, and large as 35– 
50 turbines. In the case of the solar energy alternative, 0.5–5 hectares, 20–40 hectares, and 60–100 hectares 
indicated small, medium, and large, respectively. For the biomass energy alternative, small meant 1–3 fermentation 
tanks; medium, 5–8 fermentation tanks; and large, 15–25 fermentation tanks. 
 
** This attribute relates to the adjunct share of the landscape in the 10 km surroundings which will not be used 
for renewable energy development in the future. 
***Nominal exchange rate in January 2016: 1 Euro = 4.36 zł, PPP zł/Euro in 2016 =2.346 (OECD, 2017) 
 
 
 
The choice sets were created using a Bayesian efficient design using the NGene software, 
and the C-error optimization criterion was applied (Scarpa and Rose, 2008). The final design 
comprised 24 choice sets that were blocked into four subsets, each with six choice sets. The 
order of choice sets was randomized as was the order of the first three labelled alternatives. We 
ensured that each choice set and each alternative was presented on every position a comparable 
number of times. An example choice card set is presented in Figure 1. 
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Electricity 
from wind 
Electricity from 
biomass 
Electricity 
from solar 
“Do not 
care” 
 
Minimum distance to 
residential areas 
600 m 2500 m 300 m 900 m 
 
 
Size of renewable energy 
production sites 
 
Large 
 
(35–50 turbines) 
Large 
 
(15–25 fermentation 
tanks) 
 
Small 
Medium 
(0.5–5 hectares) 
 
Number of renewable 
energy production sites 
4 5 5 3
 
Share of landscape not used 
for renewable energy 
expansion 
20% 50% 10% 30% 
High-voltage transmission 
lines 
Underground underground overhead overhead 
Monthly change in energy 
bill (annually) 
+30zł 
(+360zł) 
−10zł 
(−120zł) 
+30 
0 zł 
(+360zł) 
 
Choice     
 
Fig. 1. Example of a choice set 
 
 
 
3.3. Financial lotteries 
 
Respondents were presented with three series of lottery pairs and asked to choose one lottery 
for each pair. Moving down the list of lotteries, payoffs in Option B increase, but everything 
else is fixed. The lotteries are designed so that any combination of choices in the three series 
determines an individual’s risk preferences and loss aversion (see Table 3). 
 
 
Table 3 
 
Three series of pairwise lottery choices for the financial outcome domain 
 
Series 1 
Option A Option B EV(A)- 
EV(B) 
Prob. Payoff Prob. Payoff Prob. Payoff Prob. Payoff 
 
0.3 400 zł 0.7 100 zł 0.1 680 zł 0.9 50 zł 77 zł 
0.3 400 zł 0.7 100 zł 0.1 750 zł 0.9 50 zł 70 zł 
0.3 400 zł 0.7 100 zł 0.1 830 zł 0.9 50 zł 62 zł 
0.3 400 zł 0.7 100 zł 0.1 930 zł 0.9 50 zł 52 zł 
0.3 400 zł 0.7 100 zł 0.1 1060 zł 0.9 50 zł 39 zł 
0.3 400 zł 0.7 100 zł 0.1 1250 zł 0.9 50 zł 20 zł 
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0.3 400 zł 0.7 100 zł 0.1 1500 zł 0.9 50 zł −5 zł 
0.3 400 zł 0.7 100 zł 0.1 1850 zł 0.9 50 zł −40 zł 
0.3 400 zł 0.7 100 zł 0.1 2200 zł 0.9 50 zł −75 zł 
0.3 400 zł 0.7 100 zł 0.1 3000 zł 0.9 50 zł −155 zł 
0.3 400 zł 0.7 100 zł 0.1 4000 zł 0.9 50 zł −255 zł 
0.3 400 zł 0.7 100 zł 0.1 6000 zł 0.9 50 zł −455 zł 
0.3 400 zł 0.7 100 zł 0.1 10,000 zł 0.9 50 zł −855 zł 
0.3 400 zł 0.7 100 zł 0.1 17,000 zł 0.9 50 zł −1,555 zł 
  
Optio 
 
n A 
 Series 2  
Option B 
  
EV(A)- 
        EV(B) 
Prob. Payoff Prob. Payoff Prob. Payoff Prob. Payoff  
0.9 400 zł 0.1 300 zł 0.7 540 zł 0.3 50 zł −3 zł 
0.9 400 zł 0.1 300 zł 0.7 560 zł 0.3 50 zł −17 zł 
0.9 400 zł 0.1 300 zł 0.7 580 zł 0.3 50 zł −31 zł 
0.9 400 zł 0.1 300 zł 0.7 600 zł 0.3 50 zł −45 zł 
0.9 400 zł 0.1 300 zł 0.7 620 zł 0.3 50 zł −59 zł 
0.9 400 zł 0.1 300 zł 0.7 650 zł 0.3 50 zł −80 zł 
0.9 400 zł 0.1 300 zł 0.7 680 zł 0.3 50 zł −101 zł 
0.9 400 zł 0.1 300 zł 0.7 720 zł 0.3 50 zł −129 zł 
0.9 400 zł 0.1 300 zł 0.7 770 zł 0.3 50 zł −164 zł 
0.9 400 zł 0.1 300 zł 0.7 830 zł 0.3 50 zł −206 zł 
0.9 400 zł 0.1 300 zł 0.7 900 zł 0.3 50 zł −255 zł 
0.9 400 zł 0.1 300 zł 0.7 1000 zł 0.3 50 zł −325 zł 
0.9 400 zł 0.1 300 zł 0.7 1100 zł 0.3 50 zł −395 zł 
0.9 400 zł 0.1 300 zł 0.7 1300 zł 0.3 50 zł −535 zł 
    Series 3     
Option A Option B EV(A)- 
EV(B) 
Prob. Payoffs Prob. Payoffs Prob. Payoffs Prob. Payoffs 
 
0.5 250 zł 0.5 −40 zł 0.5 300 zł 0.5 −210 zł 60 zł 
0.5 40 zł 0.5 −40 zł 0.5 300 zł 0.5 −210 zł −45 zł 
0.5 10 zł 0.5 −40 zł 0.5 300 zł 0.5 −210 zł −60 zł 
0.5 10 zł 0.5 −40 zł 0.5 300 zł 0.5 −160 zł −85 zł 
0.5 10 zł 0.5 −80 zł 0.5 300 zł 0.5 −160 zł −105 zł 
0.5 10 zł 0.5 −80 zł 0.5 300 zł 0.5 −140 zł −115 zł 
0.5 10 zł 0.5 −80 zł 0.5 300 zł 0.5 −110 zł −130 zł 
 
 
The switching points in Series 1 and 2 jointly determine the risk preference parameter . 
In Series 1, if an individual switches from Option A in row N, it means that he or she 
prefers 
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Option A over Option B at N − 1 rows and prefers Option B over Option A in row N (and 
following rows).4 The same approach is used in Series 2 (rows notation K − 1 and K). To 
determine the value ranges for both parameters the following inequalities should be satisfied: 
 
 
 
L.1yII,l,IIIn 
 
lyI[−(− ll1III,IIIn)
n] + 1YI,IIIn 
 
 
{1 − lyI[−(− ll1III,IIIn)
n]}  > 
 
  1yII,I,IIIn 
  
lyI[−(− ll11II,IIIn)
n + 1YII,l,IIIn {1 − lyI[−(− ll11II,IIIn)
n]} 
 
1yII,I,I n lyI[−(− ll1III,In)
n] + 1Yl,I n {1 − lyI[−(− ll1III,In)
n]}  > 
 
1yII,l,I n lyI[−(− ll11II,In)
n  + 1YII,I,I n {1 − lyI[−(− ll11II,I n)
n]} 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
 
 1yIl,l,IIIn 
 
lyI[−(− ll1IIl,IIIn)
n] + 1YI,IIIn 
 
 
{1 − lyI[−(− ll1IIl,IIIn)
n]}  > 
 
   1yIl,I,IIIn 
  
lyI[−(− ll11Il,IIIn)
n + 1YIl,l,IIIn {1 − lyI[−(− ll11Il,IIIn)
n]} 
 
1yIl,I,In lyI[−(− ll1IIl,In)
n] + 1Yl,In {1 − lyI[−(− ll1IIl,In)
n]} > 
 
1yIl,l,In lyI[−(− ll11Il,In)
n + 1YIl,I,In {1 − lyI[−(− ll11Il,In)
n]} 
 
 
where x and y are outcomes, p is the probability of the outcome x,  is the probability 
weighting parameter, N and K denote the number of rows, A and B indicate the lottery options, 
and S1 and S2 denote Series 1 and Series 2, respectively. The parameter  is not uniquely 
determinable. Here, we follow Tanaka et al. (2010) and their convention of approximating 
 by taking the midpoint of the interval. The loss aversion parameter can be determined by the 
switching points in Series 3 after obtaining an estimate of  and  based on choices in 
Series 1 and 2. Similar to , the loss aversion parameter  can also be estimated as the 
midpoint of an interval; a higher 
 represents a higher degree of loss aversion. 
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4 Similar to Tanaka et al. (2010), we tried to enforce monotonic switching by asking respondents to indicate at 
which row they would switch from Option A to Option B in each series, noting that they can also start to choose 
Option B with the first row. Those who insisted on switching back, however, were allowed to do so. 
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4. Results 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Collected information regarding respondents’ experience with renewable energy production 
sites indicates that 91%, 57%, and 14% have encountered wind farms, solar, or biomass energy 
sites, respectively. Moreover, 33% of respondents stated that wind energy sites are within 10 
km of their place of residence. For solar and biomass energy sites, this share equals 35% and 
5%, respectively. Respondents considered biomass energy installations as the most disturbing 
form of renewable energy resources. In contrast, solar energy was perceived as the least 
burdensome. Results also show that the majority of respondents support the development of 
renewable energy in Poland, while a notable minority (12%) advocates for conventional energy. 
The development of nuclear energy was supported by 8%. Table 4 reports the basic socio- 
demographic characteristic of the sample. 
 
 
Table 4 
 
Descriptive statistics of the sample characteristics. 
 
Share Mean Median Min Max 
 
Women 53% 
Age 49 50 19 86 
 
Education 
 
- Primary 37% 
- Secondary 35% 
- High 28% 
Net monthly individual income in zł 1965 1500 500 15000 
 
Note: Number of respondents, N = 744. 
 
 
 
4.2. Risk preference and loss aversion parameters 
 
Table 5 presents the statistics of risk preferences and loss aversion across the sample. Risk- 
averse and risk-neutral individuals constituted 62% of the respondents. The average estimated 
value of loss aversion parameter is significantly different from 1 (t-test, p = 0.001), indicating 
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that individuals weighted losses more heavily than equivalent gains. In terms of the CE analysis 
to be reported, the risk preference parameter  and the loss aversion parameter  for  
each respondent enter via an interaction effect with the monetary attribute, separately for 
rebates and surcharges. 
 
 
 
Table 5 
 
Risk preference and loss aversion in the analyzed sample 
 
Risk preference and loss aversion 
parameters 
 
Mean St. dev. Median 
 0.81 0.48 0.85 
 
 2.61 3.64 1.11 
 
 
 
 
4.3. Model results bringing together CE and MPL responses 
 
Table 6  presents  the results  of the MXL model used to  estimate parameters  of  our 
respondents’ utility functions. The estimated coefficients reflect marginal utilities associated 
with changes in the levels of the attributes, and as a result, changes in the probability of selecting 
an alternative. The monetary attribute was transformed into two variables, one including all 
negative levels (i.e., decreases in the energy bill) and the other including all positive levels (i.e., 
increases in the energy bill). This way we can estimate separate coefficients representing the 
marginal utility of budget decrease or increase, resulting from changes in the energy bill of the 
household. 
Consumers’ preference heterogeneity is incorporated into the model by making the utility 
function parameters random according to a priori selected parametric distributions. For each 
attribute we report the estimate of the mean and standard deviation of its parameter distribution 
in the population. Although the coefficients do not have direct interpretation, their signs reflect 
whether more of a particular attribute is perceived as good or bad, while their relative values 
indicate their relative importance. 
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Table 6 
 
Estimation results 
 
Variable Distribution Means (s.e.) Standard deviations(s.e.) 
 
ASC_wind energy Normal 
2.7250*** 
(0.3637) 
 
ASC_biomass energy Normal 
1.4557*** 
(0.3717) 
 
ASC_solar energy Normal 
4.8052*** 
(0.3802) 
 
Distance Normal 
0.3861*** 
(0.0629) 
 
REPS size Normal  
-0.0349 
(0.0854) 
 
REPS number Normal 
-0.0775* 
(0.0466) 
 
Landscape Normal  
0.5860* 
(0.3433) 
 
HVTL Normal 
0.2175** 
(0.1024) 
5.2560*** 
(0.4184) 
4.7420*** 
(0.4273) 
5.6042*** 
(0.4089) 
0.6206*** 
(0.0881) 
0.4307*** 
(0.0948) 
0.2437*** 
(0.0630) 
2.3734*** 
(0.6671) 
1.0987*** 
(0.3786) 
Rebate per month † -5.4470*** 3.3359*** 
(income increase) in Euro 
Lognormal
 (1.1679) (0.6163) 
 (loss aversion) 
-0.9641***
 
(0.3503) 
 (risk preferences) 
0.5293*
 
(0.2723) 
Surcharge per month 
(income decrease) in Euro 
Lognormal
 
-1.5340*** 
(0.1538) 
2.1267*** 
(0.1695) 
 (loss aversion) 
-0.0134
 
(0.1213) 
 
 (risk preferences) 
-0.4726*** 
(0.1231) 
 
Model diagnostics  
LL at constants only -3667.77 
LL at convergence -5670.44 
McFadden's pseudo-R² 0.3532 
Ben-Akiva-Lerman’s pseudo-R² 0.4749 
Number of observations 4,464 
Number of individuals 744 
Number of parameters 69 
† For lognormally distributed parameters the coefficients of the underlying normal distribution are reported. 
***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, 10% significance level, respectively. 
 
 
Overall, the model is highly significant, and the signs of the parameters for nonmonetary 
attributes are generally as expected and also similar to the results found in the similar CE 
application in Germany (see Oehlmann and Meyerhoff, 2016). On average, the respondents 
would like to have an influence on the renewable energy extension in their neighborhood. The 
significance and signs of alternative-specific constants (ASCs) indicate that, all else held 
18  
constant, the respondents prefer solar power over wind power and wind power over electricity 
from biogas in the 10 km surroundings of their place of residence. 
Our results further indicate that people generally want REPS to be further from their place 
of residence as opposed to near. This finding aligns with what many other studies concerned 
with the externalities have found, especially for wind power (e.g., see Knapp and Ladenburg, 
2015). With regard to the size of the REPS, the sign is negative but not statistically significant, 
suggesting that the size of the sites is not an important issue for respondents. The number of 
REPS influences the probability of choosing an option negatively. Similar results were obtained 
inter alia by Navrud et al., (2007) for wind turbines and hydroelectric power plants. Finally, the 
probability of choosing an alternative is significantly and positively influenced by the size of 
area in respondents’ neighbourhood not used for renewable energy expansion and by building 
new high-voltage transmission lines underground. These findings are in line with results for 
example by Des Rosiers (2002) or Navrud et al. (2008). Relatively large and significant 
standard deviations in our model indicate the presence of substantial unobserved preference 
heterogeneity. 
Turning to the main objectives of our analysis, we find both surcharge and rebate parameters 
to be statistically significant. While by assuming lognormal distributions we impose positive 
utility of money (income), the coefficients vary depending on whether respondent’s income is 
increased or decreased.5 The results indicate that, on average, marginal utility of money is lower 
with a money gain than with a money loss (cf. Faccioli et al., 2016). 
Three parameters among the four interactions consisting of the two monetary variables and 
the risk aversion and loss aversion parameters are statistically significant. Loss aversion seems 
to play a role when people receive a rebate, while risk aversion matters both when people get a 
 
 
 
 
5 Note that coefficients of lognormally distributed parameters in Table 3 refer to the underlying normal distribution; 
once these parameters are exponentiated they become strictly positive. 
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rebate and when they have to pay a surcharge for a chosen alternative. Starting with loss 
aversion, the parameter shows that the more loss averse respondents were in the lotteries, the 
higher the rebates they required (their marginal utility of income for income increase was lower) 
for accepting wind, solar, or biomass instead of status quo. Thus, people who are more loss 
averse require more compensation before they accept externalities from renewable electricity 
production. In the case of income decrease (increase of monthly charges) we did not observe 
significant effects of loss aversion. 
The influence of risk preferences was significant for both, income increase and decrease. In 
the case of the former (rebate), more risk affine respondents were also more sensitive to money, 
and hence lower rebates were able to compensate them for the same attribute level changes. For 
income decrease (surcharge), respondents with higher risk preference had lower marginal utility 
of money, and hence required larger monetary amounts were needed to balance their utility 
levels in the case of other attribute level changes. 
To illustrate the differences in preferences between respondents with different levels of risk 
and loss aversion, we simulated the mean WTP associated with our choice attributes for 
respondents with different levels of  and λ. Because our model allows marginal utility 
of money to vary depending on whether alternatives in the choice sets present a surcharge 
or a rebate to an electricity bill, it is also possible to calculate WTP with respect to income 
increase or decrease. The results for significant main effects and labels are provided in 
Figure 2. The contour plots show how respondents’ WTP changes if their loss aversion and 
risk parameters simultaneously vary from one standard deviation below the observed mean  
in the sample, through the sample mean, to one standard deviation above. 
A clear pattern that emerges for these attributes is that WTP expressed with respect to 
income increase is much more sensitive to changes in respondents’ loss aversion, while WTP 
expressed with respect to income decrease is more sensitive to changes in respondents’ risk 
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preferences. This way we provide an intuitive illustration for the results presented in Table 6, 
across a wide range of values of and  parameters observed in the sample. 
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Fig. 2. WTP for changes in removable energy development simulated for money gain and loss 
for respondents with different loss aversion and risk preferences. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we examine the impact of the direction of price changes on the valuation of 
avoiding renewable energy externalities in Poland and investigate whether the potential 
asymmetry in respondents to price increases and decreases is driven by financial loss aversion 
and risk preferences – the key elements of prospect theory. Analyzing data from a large sample 
of the Polish population, we find that marginal utility of money seems to be lower with a rebate 
on the energy bill than with a surcharge to avoid. This result adds to the literature suggesting 
that people care about the mechanisms by which the funds for public projects are raised (e.g., 
see Ozdemir et al., 2016, Aravena et al., 2014, or Wlezien, 2004). 
As far as we know, this study is the first to investigate the effects of financial loss aversion 
and risk preferences on the acceptance of price decreases or increases in a CE. Our findings 
indicate that financial risk preferences affect people’s choices both in the case of a surcharge 
and in the case of a rebate while loss aversion for money affects them only when people receive 
a rebate. These results are in line with Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) and Weber et al. 
(2007), who argue that loss aversion in money is not present during a buying process. 
Surprisingly, however, we find that financial loss aversion seems to play a role in a selling 
process (accepting the price decrease). In the context of our study, this observation can be 
connected with potential uncertainty concerning the total effects of renewable energy 
development. 
We find that the more risk seeking people are in a financial domain, the less cost sensitive 
they are and the more they are willing to pay for proposed changes in renewable energy 
development. At the same time people who are more risk averse require less compensation 
before they accept externalities from renewable electricity production. With respect to the loss 
aversion, the more loss averse people are with regard to money, the more compensation they 
require before they accept externalities from renewable electricity production. Intuitively, these 
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findings make sense. People are assumed to be risk averse with respect to small decrements 
from current wealth, which would occur in the context of a surcharge, and this aversion would 
be expected to increase as their uncertainty about the impact on their utility grew, resulting in 
a lower WTP the more risk averse an individual is. Likewise, the more loss averse an individual 
is, the higher the rebate required for them to prefer the alternative over the FSQ. Additionally, 
the more financially risk averse a person is the higher rebate they require for accepting 
renewable energy externalities. 
More research is needed to investigate the generalizability of these results. In the case 
of loss aversion, our interpretation relies on the assumption that the FSQ is respondents’ 
reference point, as opposed to another (unobserved) scenario. Nevertheless, our results have 
implications for the value of nonmarket goods and services since they imply that this value 
changes depending on how people are required to fund the goods and services and how they 
are valued in a SP study. We have provided one potential cause, but there may well be other 
significant factors that also influence choices that could be investigated in the future, while 
controlling for the observed impact of risk preferences and loss aversion. Referring to the article 
by Aravena et al. (2014), we finally conclude that money seems to talk in certain circumstances, 
although we would prefer it to be silent because it can significantly influence the value of 
environmental changes. 
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